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I. INTRODUCTION
Fasten your seatbelts. The flight is about to begin. The title of
the present Article is a carry-forward from an article published a few
years ago.1 The two-headed nightingale refers to the views held by
Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg. Albert Jan van den Berg
had called on “party-appointed arbitrators [to] observe the principle:
nemine dissentiente.”2 Jan Paulsson took the first public position
advocating abolition of the present system in which two partyappointed arbitrators decide, by one means or another, on someone to
preside over the tribunal. Jan Paulsson has not stopped selling his
brand of medicine,3 and the same goes for Albert Jan van den Berg.4
The purpose of this article is to furnish its reader with more sensible
counterarguments to those proposing elimination of conventional
investor-State arbitration.

1. See generally Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the TwoHeaded Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed
Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7 (2013).
2. Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in
Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et. al.eds. 2010).
3. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013). See generally Jan
Paulsson, Sore Losers and What to Do About Them (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished notes) (The
authors received these notes from Paulsson.); Jan Paulsson, Shall We Have an Adult
Conversation About Legitimacy? (Mar. 2, 2017) in THE BLOG OF THE CPR (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://blog.cpradr.org/2017/03/15/shall-we-have-an-adult-conversation-about-legitimacy/.
Professor Paulsson’s arguments in his book and lectures are largely repetitive of his
original points contained in, see generally Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International
Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J. 339 (2010). Many of these points
have been addressed in Brower, supra note 1 (The points he makes in his book and lectures
overlap somewhat, but they are not identical and cover different grounds.).
4. See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Charles Brower’s Problem With 100 Percent –
Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L
381 (2015).
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II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE
AGREEMENT – POLITICS ABOUND
The new head-scratcher is the international investment court
proposed by the European Commission and its unlikely survival on
the back of a fifteen-headed hydra. Why choose a mythical creature?
Because it is not real and the bench of the international investment
court is to be filled by fifteen judges “appointed” exclusively by
States.
As a yet non-working example, the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) between the European Union and
Canada sets out the appointment procedure prescribes five
appointments by Canada, five appointments by some means by the
twenty-seven (post-Brexit) Member States of the European Union,
and another five appointments from other nationalities commonly
agreed by the two treaty parties.5 Notably, appointment of these
judges will involve a political “scrum.”
There is no way of depoliticizing any process in which States or
international organizations are the source of appointments or
elections. Even elections to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
are politicized. Most recently, there was an almighty heave-to going
on between the General Assembly and the Security Council of the
United Nations over the re-election of British ICJ Judge Sir
Christopher Greenwood and, for the first time in its seventy-one-year
history, the ICJ does not have a member from each of the five
Permanent Members of the Security Council.6 It is political. Even the
church hierarchy is well known to be political, as is known well
before the smoke rises when a new Pope is chosen.
Simply put, when viewed from a pragmatic and realistic
perspective, there is no way of depoliticizing the appointment process
of the proposed international investment court. There are twentyeight, soon to be twenty-seven, Member States of the European
Union, which possess a collection of increasingly differing views
towards the rule of law. It will be a rough-and-tumble political contest
5. Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the
European Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part, art. 8.27, Sept. 14, 2016 (entered
into force provisionally Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter CETA].
6. Owen Bowcott, No British judge on world court for first time in its 71-year history,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/20/
no-british-judge-on-world-court-for-first-time-in-its-71-year-history [http://perma.cc/6MYGP4JB].
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before they agree on their five judges. Canada is not that much better
off, given the Maritime Provinces, Quebec, the Prairie Provinces, and
the West Coast. It took Canada almost fifty years to become a party to
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”)7 and for the past
thirty-five years Quebec has continued to withhold its consent to
Canada’s Constitution for reasons that include, inter alia, its desire
for constitutionally guaranteed Quebec representation on Canada’s
apex court.8
And, how will the treaty parties unite on the selection of the five
third-country judges? Those third-country candidates are the most
important, because only they are allowed to be President or Vice
President of the overall court,9 and only they are able to preside over a
first instance three-member panel.10 There just is no way of insulating
the process from politics.
Similarly, an alarm may be sounded for the appellate instance,
which has the power not just to review issues of law but also to redetermine the facts.11 Who are these people going to be?
Undoubtedly, the establishment of such a court also becomes an
expensive process. There are numerous historical and contemporary
examples of budget concerns affecting public acceptance of an
international court or tribunal. The International Criminal Court in
The Hague and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia are recent examples of unanticipated enormous budgetary
hits.12 Who is going to pay for the international investment court?
That is not entirely clear.
7. Canada ratified the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and National of Other States on November 1, 2013, see generally DATABASE
OF ICSID MEMBER STATES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-MemberStates.aspx [http://perma.cc/CD2P-D6Y3] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
8. Amy Minsky, After 35 years, why does Quebec want in the Constitution?, GLOBAL
NEWS (June 2, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3496355/quebec-canada-constitutionamend-reopen/ [http://perma.cc/RM6C-GP9L].
9. CETA, supra note 5, art. 8.27(8).
10. Id. art. 8.27(6).
11. Id. art. 8.28(2)(b).
12. See, e.g., John Silverman, Ten years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost too
much?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946 [http://
perma.cc/DG7H-TBTZ] (reporting that the estimated expenditure of the International Criminal
Court was around $900 million for its first ten years with only one verdict and that the annual
budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had increased 500fold from its inception until 2010-11).
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Lack of security of tenure for appointed judges poses a barrier to
attracting competent and qualified individuals. To enhance their
independence, judges are barred from being involved in arbitrations
otherwise,13 but they are to be compensated well below the salaries of
judges of other permanent international fora.14 Thus although the
judges are expected to “be available at all times and on short notice,”
they would be paid a monthly retainer fee, suggested by the European
Union to be around EU€2000,15 with the President and the Vice
President potentially receiving EU€7000 a month.16 Given these terms
of service, the pool of available appointees predictably will be largely
comprised of retired civil servants, who may or may not know much,
if anything, about the field, retired judges who have limited
experience interpreting and applying international law, and other
friends of politicians, all seeking an opportunity to augment their
pensions. They will be representative of the least common
denominator selected through the process of attrition that
characterizes political compromise.
III. THE STATES’ REPOSSESSION EFFORTS
Proposing the replacement of investor-State arbitration as it
currently exists with a permanent court is a paramount example of a
larger movement by States actively to “repossess” investor-State
arbitration. The chief repo-man is the Government of the United
States. This has been occurring irrespective of which party controls
the Administration and despite the fact that foreign investor-claimants

13. Commission Press Release IP/15/5651, ch. II, art. 11(1) (Sept. 19, 2015) (“In
addition, upon appointment, [the Members of the Tribunal] shall refrain from acting as counsel
in any pending or new investment protection dispute under this or any other agreement or
domestic law.”). A similarly worded provision is found in CETA itself. See CETA, supra note
5, at Ch. 8. § F. Art. 8.30 (“In addition, upon appointment, [the Members of the Tribunal] shall
refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or new
investment dispute under this or any other international agreement.”).
14. For example, as of 2016, each member of the International Court of Justice received
an annual salary of US$172,978 with a supplementary allowance of US$15,000 for the
President. Upon leaving the Court, judges receive an annual pension, which, after a nine-year
term of office, is equal to 50 per cent of the annual base salary. See Members of the Court,
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/members [https://perma.cc/
4B5T-GULW] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
15. Commission Press Release, supra note 13, ch. II, art. 9(12).
16. Id. ch. II, art.10(12).
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are disproportionately US nationals.17 States, concerned about their
own treasury, sacrifice their own nationals who invest abroad by
reducing their protections in treaties, by interpreting their way — or
wanting to interpret their way — out of treaty protections, and others
by denouncing treaties.
As a representative example of States’ repossession efforts, one
may recall how the United States, Canada, and Mexico banded
together following a certain stage of the Pope & Talbot case.18 The
US Claimant commenced arbitration against Canada, which it
claimed had violated the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) Chapter 11 requirement that its investment in Canada
receive “fair and equitable treatment.”19 The Canadian Government
argued to the Pope & Talbot tribunal, however, that as written in
NAFTA, fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) could mean no more
than the level of treatment accorded to alien investors under
customary international law, rather than the higher standard,
independent of customary international law, generally applied by
other, non-NAFTA tribunals.20 The Tribunal ruled unanimously for
the Claimant, however, expressly rejecting Canada’s argument as
being “patently absurd.”21 Just over three months later that “patently
absurd” interpretation was adopted by the three NAFTA State Parties
as an official interpretation binding under NAFTA22 pursuant to
Articles 2001 and 1131, which fairly promptly was denounced by
Judge Sir Robert Jennings, then lately President of the International
Court of Justice, “as an attempted amendment that has no binding

17. Of the 806 cases (concluded and pending) listed on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy
Hub, Americans have acted as Claimants in 152. In other words, 18.9% of all known ISDS
cases involved or involve American Claimants. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry
[https://perma.cc/5B9G-C3NL] (last updated July 31, 2017).
18. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, (Apr. 10, 2001).
19. Id. ¶ 105.
20. Id. ¶ 108-09.
21. Id. ¶ 118.
22. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (July 31, 2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp
[https://perma.cc/
7FJA-Q4SW] (“The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”).
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effect.”23 Such actions obviously weaken alien trust in government
with respect to the protection of investors abroad.
Remarkably, this position was a complete about-face for the
United States, for as Dr. Todd Weiler has demonstrated, it was the
United States that had invented FET years before Pope & Talbot and
NAFTA, and purposefully tailored it to be a higher standard than
customary international law, entirely separate from and independent
of it.24
In the end, very little, if anything, was achieved by the NAFTA
States party to the official interpretation prompted by the Pope &
Talbot case. Both “fair and equitable treatment” and “customary
international law” are what Professor W. Michael Reisman has
described as “evaluation rules” that “establish a goal that is expressed
at some level of generality.”25 Evaluation rules are contrasted with
“[v]erification rules” which:
“are binary, ‘either-or rules.’ Beyond that binary information, the
factual and normative universe to which the person charged with
applying the rules may turn is strictly confined to a few explicit
variables, none of which includes general evaluative concepts
such as fairness, equity, justice, minimum order, efficiency, or
even common sense.”26

Professor Reisman further surmised that “each instance of application
of evaluation rules such as FET and MST [i.e., minimum standard of
treatment] re-instantiates them in different contexts, they can scarcely
avoid evolving, a fortiori, as social, economic, technological, moral,
and ethical variables change.”27 In other words, the States are
constantly making and remaking customary international law. This
was confirmed in part by Professor James Crawford, Judge Stephen
Schwebel, and The Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen, in the

23. Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, (Sept. 6, 2001), at 6 (referring to
the Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C.).
24. See TODD WEILER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT 167 (Martinus Nijhoff ed. 2013). See also KENNETH J VANDEVELDE, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 263 (Oxford University Press 2009).
25. W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts the Tide: States vs. Tribunals and the
Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law (Apr. 9, 2015), in, 109
PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 125 (2015) at 125.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 127.
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Mondev NAFTA case, in which it was made clear that customary
international law evolves.28
Consider also the 2012 United States Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty29 and one will see that the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
and his treaty counterpart can jointly preclude an investor-State
arbitration from ever happening. If the two decide that a claimed
expropriation based on a tax measure was not an expropriation, the
claimant is out of luck.30 And, there is an analogous provision with
respect to various defenses.31
A. The European Union and its Existential Crisis
While the European Commission is the originator—hence main
promoter of a permanent investment court—, it may not be the only
EU institution that is contributing to establishing a permanent
investment court. The Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) is taking a conspicuous role in the debate as is evident by a
series of decisions.
In 2017, the European Commission was confident that the EU’s
Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with Singapore, its first, and all
future EU trade and investment treaties would fall within its exclusive
competence (Article 207 of the Treaty of the European Union
(“TFEU”)), including the treaties’ dispute resolution provisions.32
This appears no longer to be the case in light of a CJEU Opinion
issued in May 2017. The issue before the CJEU was whether the EUSingapore FTA required ratification by each of the EU Member
States.33 The CJEU noted that the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(“ISDS”) regime removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the
national courts of the Member States and thus is not “of a purely
ancillary nature . . . and cannot, therefore, be established without the

28. See generally Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002).
29. See generally United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012).
30. Id. art. 21(2).
31. Id. art. 31. See generally, Charles N. Brower & Sarah Melikian, “We Have Met the
Enemy and He Is Us!” Is the Industrialized North “Going South” on Investor-State
Arbitration? 31 ARB. INT’L 19 (2015).
32. Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, Opinion 2/15 Of the Court,
EU:C:2017:376, 2017, ¶¶ 10-16, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:62015CV0002(01) [https://perma.cc/XKE4-7CZ7].
33. Id. ¶ 29.
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Member States’ consent.”34 Inasmuch as the EU-Singapore FTA
included a basically conventional ISDS provision, Canada and the
European Union have felt constrained to exclude the investment court
system contained in CETA from even the provisional application of
CETA.35 Thus the CJEU will require all EU Member States’
ratification of any EU treaties that include that court provision,
including CETA. The EU treaty negotiators may have to be clever
and slide some substantive trade benefits into the agreement to
encourage ratification.
Rallying all EU Member States to agree on a treaty is
challenging as there are different views. The Advocate General
Melchior Wathelet at the CJEU has rendered a non-binding (but
frequently persuasive) opinion with respect to a request for a
preliminary ruling submitted by the German Federal Court of Justice
in May 2016 to the CJEU concerning the Netherlands-Slovakia
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”).36 The German court had referred
a series of questions concerning the compatibility of intra-EU BITs
with EU law.37 The German court’s questions arose in the context of
an application by the Slovak Republic to annul an arbitral award
issued in favor of Achmea (formerly Eureko), a Dutch investor, under
the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.38
The intriguing features of the opinion, however, were the
Advocate General’s observations on the EU Member States’
contradictory ISDS practices.
The Advocate General noted that several EU Member States had
intervened in the proceedings and made both oral and written
submissions.39 He noted that the intervening EU Member States could
be divided into two groups.40 The first group consists of States that
“are essentially countries of origin of the investors and therefore

34. Id. ¶ 292.
35. CETA Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/infocus/ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2017).
36. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic v. Achmea
BV, Case C-284/16, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CC0284 [https://perma.cc/YSS9-4CPF].
37. Id.¶ 30.
38. See generally Advocate General of EU Court of Justice rejects contentions that
intra-EU bilateral investment treaty is incompatible with EU law, IAREPORTER (Sept. 19,
2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/28492/ [https://perma.cc/WQN9-KG5R].
39. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic, Case C-284/16, ¶¶ 31-35.
40. Id. ¶ 34.
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never or rarely respondents in arbitral proceedings launched by
investors[.]”41 These States are the Federal Republic of Germany, the
French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of
Austria, and the Republic of Finland.42 The second group consists of
States that “have all been respondents in a number of arbitral
proceedings relating to intra-EU investments.”43 These States are the
Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the
Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the
Republic of Latvia, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, and
the Slovak Republic.44
The Advocate General noted that it was “hardly surprising” that
the second group of EU Member States “intervened in support of the
argument put forward by the Slovak Republic, which is itself the
respondent to the investment arbitration at issue in the present case.”45
Yet he found it “surprising” that the same States, with the exception
of Italy, had not moved to terminate their respective intra-EU BITs,
which, thus, remained in force in whole or in part.46 When Slovakia
was asked at the hearing why it had not terminated its other BITs with
the States in the second group, Slovakia admitted “that its objective
was to ensure that its own investors would not be the victims of
discrimination by comparison with investors from other Member
States in the Member States with which it would no longer have
BITs.”47
The Advocate General’s opinion speaks volumes regarding what
the other EU organs may think of the European Commission’s
campaign to end ISDS.
Yet, the Advocate General’s opinion fell on deaf years as the
CJEU ruled on March 6, 2018, that ISDS provisions in intra-EU BITs
are incompatible with EU law.48 The decision prompted the

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. ¶ 35.
45. Id. ¶ 36.
46. Id. ¶ 37 (The Advocate General did, however, note that Italy was the only EU
Member State falling within the second group that had moved to terminate its intra-EU BITs,
with exception of the Italy-Malta BIT).
47. Id. ¶ 38.
48. See generally Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, Case C-284/16,
[2018]
ECLI:EU:C:2018:158,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A62016CJ0284 [https://perma.cc/HU9S-GFP4].
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Netherlands—one of the States falling under Advocate General
Wathelet’s first group49—to announce reluctantly its decision to
terminate all twelve of its intra-EU BITs.50
The full implications of the CJEU’s opinion in Achmea are
unclear, but it could be viewed as the CJEU forcing EU investors in
other EU Member States to accept the EU Commission’s proposal to
resolve all investment disputes through the permanent investment
court. It seems other EU actors may have heard the rallying cry
because their efforts to establish the permanent court were amped up
following the Achmea decision.
Two weeks after the Achmea decision, the EU Council issued a
negotiating directive for establishing a permanent investment court
for the settlement of investment disputes with the EU Commission
designated as the authorized representative.51 All analysis and
discussion concerning the proposal, according to the directive,
“should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).”52
Less than a month later, the EU Commission presented a final
text of its agreement with Singapore to the EU Council as well as a
new FTA, the latter of which displaces the previously agreed ISDS
provision with the Investment Court System promoted by the EU and
adopted in CETA.53 The EU Council will now adopt and sign the
agreements before obtaining the EU Parliament’s consent.54 While the
49. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic, Case C-284/16, ¶ 34.
50. Letter of Sigrid A.M. Kaag, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister (Apr. 26, 2018). See
Lacey Yong, Netherlands to terminate BIT with Slovakia in wake of Achmea, GLOB. ARB.
REV. (May 2, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168905/netherlands-toterminate-bit-with-slovakia-in-wake-of-achmea [http://perma.cc/JS8T-V2ZS].
51. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council for the European Union to
Delegations, about Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for
the settlement of investment disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1 (Mar. 20, 2018); Sebastian
Perry, EU Council gives go-ahead for talks on multilateral court, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Mar. 21,
2018),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1167071/eu-council-gives-go-ahead-fortalks-on-multilateral-court [http://perma.cc/K8MT-WFU6].
52. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council for the European Union to
Delegations, about Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for
the settlement of investment disputes, supra note 51, ¶ 4.
53. See EU-Singapore trade and investment agreements (authentic texts as of April
2018), FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (APR. 18, 2018), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961
[https://perma.cc/487B-SFG2];
Lacey
Yong, EU unveils new investment agreements with Singapore, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Apr. 20,
2018),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168166/eu-unveils-new-investmentagreement-with-singapore [https://perma.cc/9YF7-3GD3].
54. Yong, supra note 53.
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FTA will take effect in 2019, the investment protection agreement
will take effect following the ratification by each EU Member
State55—a move necessary in light of the CJEU’s ruling discussed
earlier concerning the EU-Singapore FTA.
On the heels of announcing the final EU-Singapore agreements,
the EU and Mexico unveiled an “agreement in principle” in which the
Contracting Parties agreed to establish a permanent investment court
to resolve investment disputes.56
It may be wrong to presume that the CJEU is a promoter of the
EU Commission’s permanent investment court. On September 6,
2017, Belgium formally asked the CJEU to assess the compatibility of
the CETA’s Investment Court System with EU law. Specifically,
Belgium has asked whether the “Investment Court System” is
compatible with EU citizens’ right of access to courts, the “general
principle of equality,” and the CJEU's exclusive competence over EU
law and how the proposed court would affect the “right to an
independent and impartial judiciary.”57 The CJEU has yet to issue an
opinion on the issue and, thus, it remains to be seen whether the
CJEU truly joins its fellow EU institutions in preferring the EUproposed permanent court.
IV. OTHER ACTORS PROMOTING THE REVOLT AGAINST THE
CURRENT ISDS FRAMEWORK
A. The CIDS Report and its Supplement
The newest, and most directly serious threat to ISDS as presently
known and favored overwhelmingly by its users, however, comes in
the form of a 115-page “research paper . . . prepared for . . .
UNCITRAL [United Nations Commission on International Trade
55. Id.
56. See New EU-Mexico Agreement, The Agreement in Principle, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Apr. 23, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1833
[https://perma.cc/H7YQ-H59P].
57. See Douglas Thomson, ECJ to rule on CETA investment court, GLOB. ARB. NEWS
(Sept. 6, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147140/ecj-to-rule-on-cetainvestment-court [https://perma.cc/4N6D-H29A]; Damien Charlotin, ANALYSIS: EU’s highest
court is asked once more to weigh in on international investment law questions – this time by
Belgium in relation to CETA’s “investment court system,” IAREPORTER (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-eus-highest-court-is-asked-once-more-to-weighin-on-international-investment-law-questions-this-time-by-belgium-in-relation-to-cetasinvestment-court-system/ [https://perma.cc/4SKT-BJZ4].
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Law] [at its request] within the framework of a project of the Geneva
Center of International Dispute Settlement (‘CIDS’)”58 by Professor
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, that Center’s Co-Director, and Dr.
Michele Potestà, a Senior Researcher at that Center (“CIDS Report”).
This was presented to the UNCITRAL Commission by way of a note
prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat dated May 24, 2016, 59 and
most recently was discussed extensively at the UNCITRAL
Commission’s 50th Session in Vienna held July 3-21, 2017,60
following the holding of an “UNCITRAL-CIDS Government Expert
Meeting” in Geneva March 2-3, 2017.61
The opening paragraph of the Executive Summary of this
“research paper” summarizes its mission as being “to analyze whether
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency could provide a useful
model for broader reform of the investor-State arbitration
framework.”62 Specifically, it “proposes a possible roadmap that
could be followed if States were to decide to pursue a reform
initiative aimed at replacing or supplementing the existing investorState arbitration regime in international investment agreements (IIAs)
with a permanent investment tribunal and/or an appeal mechanism for
investor-State arbitral awards.”63
Notwithstanding the “research” character of the CIDS paper
commissioned by UNCITRAL, it appears to lend considerable
support in substance to the “Fifteen-Headed Hydra” threatening ISDS
as it presently exists and to point towards the European Union’s goal
58. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention serve
as a model for the reform of investor-State arbitration in connection with the introduction of a
permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism?: Analysis and roadmap, GENEVA
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT [CIDS], 5 (June 3, 2016).
59. Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Presentation of a
Research Paper on the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration as a Possible Model for Further Reforms of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ¶¶
3-5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/890 (May 24, 2016).
60. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law at its Fiftieth Session, Supplement
No. 17, ¶¶ 240-65, U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (July 2017); Professor Nikos Lavranos, The first steps
towards a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), EFILA BLOG (July 19, 2017),
https://efilablog.org/2017/07/19/the-first-steps-towards-a-multilateral-investment-court-mic/
[https://perma.cc/EUV4-UDDH].
61. See generally Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement. UNCITRAL-CIDS
Government Expert Meeting, CIDS – GENEVA CTR FOR INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT,
http://www.cids.ch/events-2/past-events/634-2/ [https://perma.cc/PC9N-URJ3] (last visited
Apr. 29, 2018).
62. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at 4.
63. Id. at 4.
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of establishing an Investment Court System, otherwise termed a
fifteen-Judge International Investment Court.64 Specifically, the CIDS
Report focuses primarily on whether an award by a hypothetical
permanent court could be enforced under the New York Convention
(“NY Convention”).65
The CIDS Report notes that the NY Convention does not define
“arbitration,” “arbitral tribunal” or “arbitral award” but that Article
I(2) of the NY Convention mentions awards by “permanent arbitral
bodies.”66 By considering the travaux préparatoires of “permanent
arbitral bodies” under Article I of the NY Convention, the Iran-United
64. Id. ¶ 93.
65. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 138.
66. Article I of the NY Convention:
1. The Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.
2. The term “arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to
which the parties have submitted.
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I,
opened for signature June 10, 1958 (entered into force on June 7, 1959) (emphasis added).
There is an open query as to whether the IUSCT is a “permanent arbitral bod[y]” under Article
I(2) of the NY Convention. See The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. III, ¶ 4, Jan.
19, 1981 (“Claims Settlement Declaration”) (setting a deadline for filing claims with the
IUSCT both by nationals of the United States against Iran and nationals of Iran against the
United States, as well as for claims by either of the two States party to that Declaration against
the other based on contracts for the purchase and sale of goods and services) (“No claim may
be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement or six
months after the date the President is appointed, whichever is later. These deadlines do not
apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Declaration of the
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981.”); see also Re: Refusal to Accept the Claim of Mr.
Victor E. Pereira, Decision No. DEC 2-Ref 5-2, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Mar. 10,
1982), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, at 3 (“Since the President was appointed on June
4, 1981, the last day on which the noted claims could be filed was January 19, 1982.”); CHARLES
N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 95
(1998).
The exception to the January 19, 1982, deadline are interpretive disputes (or “A” claims)
between the United States and Iran. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, ¶¶ 16-17, January 19, 1981 (“General Declaration”).
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States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) and sport-based arbitral
institutions, the CIDS Report opines that awards by such institutions
may be enforced under the NY Convention.67 This is despite the fact
that those bodies were not formed by unilateral appointments of the
respective nationals who presented the vast bulk of the claims subject
to the IUSCT’s jurisdiction or of athletes whose complaints are
subjected to the jurisdiction of sport-based arbitral institutions.68
Turning, then, from what had been posed as an enforcement
issue, the CIDS Report concludes that because the IUSCT is an
example of an “arbitration” in which the U.S. claimants had no say in
the appointment of the arbitrators deciding their cases,69 it justifies
more broadly the envisaged International Investment Court.
Enforcement of IUSCT awards did not raise issues “about the fact
that [the Tribunal’s] composition did not reflect traditional methods
of appointment in international arbitration.” 70 Rather, it was debated
whether the IUSCT awards were rendered under the Dutch lex arbitri
or were “a-national” and whether there was an arbitration agreement
in writing. 71
This leap from enforceability to per se justification of investorState arbitration as presently known now being replaced by an
International Investment Court, however, wholly disregards the fact
that the IUSCT was established through negotiations that took place
starting only early in November 1980 and until the conclusion of the
Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981.72 The negotiations, conducted
via Algeria as intermediary, had as their principal object the release of
52 American hostages. Save for two of the American hostages, all
were United States diplomatic or consular officers, and all had been
held captive for 444 days.73 The Iranian seizure had resulted in two
United Nations Security Council Resolutions,74 an order of the
International Court of Justice,75 long ignored by Iran, compelling the
67. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, ¶¶ 95-96, 148-54.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 94.
70. Id. ¶ 95.
71. Id.
72. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
http://www.iusct.net/ [https://perma.cc/7Q6K-WSUV] (last visited May 23, 2018).
73. BROWER, supra note 66, at 4-5.
74. See S.C. Res. 457 (Dec. 4, 1979); S.C. Res. 461 (Dec. 31, 1979).
75. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Order on
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. at 17-18 (Dec. 15); United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep., ¶¶ 75, 91-92 (May. 24).
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hostages’ release, and a failed US Army Delta Force raid at Desert
One in Iran mounted to free the hostages.76 To rely on such a hurried
solution of a serious international crisis as a model for normal
investor-State arbitration is, frankly, beyond reason. It is equally true
of the famous Alabama arbitration that benefitted the American
shipowners whose vessels were sunk or burned by raiders from
Confederate States during the American Civil War, i.e., the CSS
Alabama and a number of others, and the American owners of cargos
thereby lost. That arbitration forestalled incipient hostilities between
the United Kingdom, which against the international laws incumbent
on neutral States had suffered those raiders to be built in England,77
and the United States, likewise had no arbitrators appointed by the
shipowners and owners of lost cargos. Similar to the IUSCT, the
United States and the United Kingdom appointed one arbitrator each,
and agreed that three others would be appointed from Brazil, Italy,
and Switzerland.78 It is simply illogical, indeed, unreasonable in the
extreme, to cite a tribunal formed to resolve a pending front-page
international crisis between two nations who are at daggers’ points as
justifying deprivation of arbitrating parties’ historic enjoyment of the
right to appoint arbitrators and collaborate in the selection of a
tribunal chairperson.
No less inapposite is the CIDS Report’s reliance on certain rules
that “provide for the institution’s sole power to appoint the arbitrators,
without any input from the parties.”79 As examples, however, the
CIDS Report cites only the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”)
Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, which state that the
President of the ad hoc Division will appoint one or three arbitrators
from a preselected list without the disputing parties’ input,80 and the
Arbitration Rules of the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (“BAT”), which
provide that “all disputes before the BAT shall be decided by a single
76. See Mark Bowden, The Desert One Debacle, THE ATLANTIC May 2006,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/
[https://perma.cc/VE5Z-E4JL].
77. U.S. Dep’t of State’s Office of the Historian, The Alabama Claims, 1862–1872 (last
visited Apr. 29, 2018), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/alabama [https://
perma.cc/K7RK-R23H].
78. V.V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The PartyAppointed Arbitrator - From Miami to Geneva, in PRACTICING VIRTUE: INSIDE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 134 (David D. Caron et al., eds., 2015).
79. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 96.
80. Id.; Court of Arb. for Sport Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games art. 11.
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Arbitrator appointed by the BAT President on a rotational basis from
the published list of BAT arbitrators.”81 The CIDS Report concludes
that while the parties have no influence on the composition of the
panels before the CAS ad hoc division or before the BAT, “it is
undisputed that these mechanisms are in the nature of arbitration.”82
With respect, these are regulatory and disciplinary bodies whose
authority the athletes involved necessarily accept as a condition of
competing in the relevant sporting events. They are much like the
national or regional authorities regulating the conduct of lawyers,
physicians and other professionals. Obtaining a professional license,
or entering into a competitive sporting event subject to the regulation
of CAS or BAT, brings with it automatic subjection of oneself to the
relevant regulatory authority. Those subject to CAS or BAT have no
more expectation of enjoying the benefits of ISDS as presently known
than does a member of the Bar of any country to be able to appoint
someone to the disciplinary authority that exists for the profession.
All in all, the CIDS Report dwells principally on what can be termed
“arbitration,” rather than on the distinctions of genesis, character, or
subject matter of the various fora.83
Within the context of enforcement under the NY Convention, the
CIDS Report concludes that the unilateral right of appointment is not
as important as the parties’ consensual submission to arbitration.84
There is no denying that party freedom is paramount and if parties
choose to do away with their right of appointment that is their
81. Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitration Rules art. 8.1 (2017).
82. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 96.
83. Given the large number of doping-related disputes in sport arbitrations, one
commentator has even queried whether such disputes fall under the NY Convention given their
non-commercial nature. See Roger Alford, Are CAS Arbitrations Governed by the New York
Convention?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 8, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2009/03/08/are-cas-arbitrations-governed-by-the-new-york-convention/?_ga=
2.156422331.1237221282.1499359155-1066329609.1481846792
[https://perma.cc/D5Y25VP2]. This may explain, according to other commentators, how enforcement under the NY
Convention of sport-based arbitral awards is not as important for commercial-based arbitral
awards “because the sport governing bodies have internal enforcement mechanisms that are
highly effective.” See DANIEL GIRSBERGER & NATHALIE VOSER, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COMPARATIVE AND SWISS PERSPECTIVES 489 (3d ed. 2016). The Swiss
Supreme Court criticized “the lack of transparency of who nominated the arbitrators for their
position on the list,” id., at 506. Commentators have described the lack of arbitrators “that
represent athletes’ interests, but without transparency, an athlete has no way of knowing who
those arbitrators are,” id. This only adds more credence to the significance of unilateral
appointments.
84. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 97-98.
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prerogative. But the CIDS Report’s conclusion in relation to
enforceability does nothing to undermine the long-established right of
unilateral appointment, which is a fundamental—if not crucial—
feature of arbitration, especially of investor-State arbitration.
The CIDS Report also draws its conclusions within the confines
of the NY Convention, which is an important treaty in the history of
arbitration, but cannot be representative of all that is regarded as
“arbitration.” There is a litany of treaties and rules demonstrating the
value of the unilateral right of appointment. The NY Convention’s
scope being limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards and arbitration agreements, it “does not provide for any
obligation to be met by the parties as to the number of arbitrators or
the method of their appointment.”85 Facilitating the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements is
undoubtedly vital if arbitration is to have teeth. What constitutes
“arbitration” and how the tribunal is to be constituted are, however,
equivalently important. These were intentionally left open in the NY
Convention.86 To go from awards by “permanent arbitral bodies”
being enforceable under the NY Convention to conclude that partyappointment is not an essential feature of arbitration goes too far. The
party-appointment procedure—let alone other features of the arbitral
process—were simply not in the contemplation of the drafters of the
NY Convention.87
The NY Convention was one initiative amongst others
spearheaded by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and
its successors. “The evolution of an effective and trustworthy private
international arbitration system over the last half a century has had
three major strands,”88 of which the NY Convention was but one. The
1976 (and 2010) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 1985 Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model

85. ALFONSO GÓMEZ-ACEBO, PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 26 (2016).
86. U.S. Dep’t of State’s Office of the Historian, supra note 77.
87. See U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/2840 (Mar. 22, 1956). The
Secretary-General prepared a memorandum for the ECOSOC on the draft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and whether a conference should be
called to address the topic.
88. DAVID D. CARON & LEE M. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A
COMMENTARY 1-2 (2d ed. 2013).
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Law) were the others,89 and both expressly provide unilateral right of
appointment by disputing arbitrants.90
To its credit, the CIDS Report recognizes the fact that
appointment of judges to an International Investment Court solely by
States or the EU alone necessarily raises justified doubts on the part
of investors as to the true impartiality of such judges, and, therefore,
emphasizes that the process should not be politicized.91 They query
whether it is desirable that only States participate in the election
process or whether the investors should also have a say.92
It is unrealistic to believe that international organizations,
including the European Union, and States will act utterly devoid of
political considerations when making the appointments to an
International Investment Court.93
One of the co-authors of this Article, apart from experience in
the United States Senate, the United States Department of State, and
the White House, has for decades, in The Hague and at the United
Nations in New York City, been observing elections to the ICJ. In
fact, ICJ elections (excluding elections of nationals of the Permanent
Five Members of the Security Council, until most recently, as noted
above, the sitting British Judge was denied re-election) are highly
political; and, hence, do involve tradeoffs and “deals.” It is an illusion
to think that the process can be de-politicized.
89. Id.
90. See G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) (“If three
arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators
thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the
tribunal.”) (emphasis added); G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/65/465 (2010) (“If three
arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators
thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the
arbitral tribunal.”) (emphasis added); U.N. Commission on International Trade Law,
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 11(3), U.N. Doc.
A/40/17, annex I (June 21, 1985) (“Failing such agreement, (a) in an arbitration with three
arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators thus appointed
shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to appoint the arbitrator within thirty days of
receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the
third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon
request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in article 6.”) (emphasis added).
91. Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 81.
92. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 166-69.
93. The authors appear to accept that “some degree of politics in the selection process is
unavoidable” as stated in their Supplemental Report issued in November 2017. See Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court
and of an Appeal Mechanism for Investment Awards: CIDS Supplemental Report, GENEVA
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT [CIDS], ¶ 109 (Nov. 15, 2017).
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It is equally misguided to think that “a consultation of business
organizations, i.e., organizations representative of investor
interests,”94 will have a significant influence that will reduce the
political character of such appointments. There is no obligation on
States to follow any recommendation by such organizations on the
composition of the hypothetical permanent investment court. It is
further presumptuous to think that these organizations would give any
consideration to the issue in the first place. Arbitral disputes are not at
the top of these organizations’ agendas vis-à-vis their respective
governments and any international organizations—let alone
individual investors—and disputes may not even transpire until many
years later, when there is nothing to suggest that any of the
recommendations of business organizations now would be
representative of the putative investor that may end up before the
permanent investment court in the future. While investors themselves
may have a degree of influence, it is not worth much. A right to be
consulted is equivalent to a ballot paper with a disclaimer that the
vote may not be counted.
On the day of the keynote address at the 12th Annual Fordham
International Arbitration Conference, the authors of this article
received a copy of a Supplemental Report to the CIDS Report
(Supplemental Report). The authors of the Supplemental Report
augment their initial report by providing further analysis on the
composition of a hypothetical permanent court.95 In their
Supplemental Report, the authors explained that their proposal in their
initial CIDS Report “presuppose[s] the creation of multilateral
permanent adjudicatory bodies, the ITI [i.e., International Tribunal for
Investments] and/or the AM [i.e., Appeals Mechanism], whereby the
former would provide an alternative to the current ad hoc system of
investor-State arbitration and the latter would supplement it.”96
The Supplemental Report identifies three consequences of
transitioning from the current “ad hoc system”—which is understood
to refer to a dispute resolution body constituted on a case-by-case
basis for a single dispute97—to a permanent or semi-permanent body
on the arbitrator-selection process. Of those three, the first is relevant
for our purposes. The Supplemental Report acknowledges that the
94.
95.
96.
97.

Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 168.
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 93, at ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
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unilateral right of party-appointment would be eliminated if the
appointing power rests exclusively on States:
The first consequence is the transition from a disputing party
framework to a treaty or contracting party framework.
Transitioning from an ad hoc system that allows virtually
complete control over composition by the disputing parties to
a permanent or semi-permanent system necessarily reduces
the role for disputing parties and conversely increases that of
treaty parties. As the dispute resolution body must exist before
the investment dispute arises, it must necessarily be established
ex ante by the treaty parties. This entails moving beyond the
“historical keystone” of arbitration, namely disputing party
appointment, to a different selection method placed entirely or
predominantly in the hands of the parties to the instrument
establishing the new adjudicatory bodies. Such dilution of
powers concerns all disputing parties, including respondent
States who lose the “right” to influence the composition of the
body as disputing parties. However, in practice, it will be
perceived as affecting the investor-party more heavily, as
States will be able to contribute to the composition of the
body in their capacity of treaty parties.98

The tilting of the scales in favor of States is in no way
diminished by the fact that the respondent-State in an investment
dispute also is deprived of the opportunity to select an arbitrator once
the dispute is afoot. While the authors of the Supplemental Report
acknowledge this fact, the consequences of it are indeed minimal, if
not infinitesimal.
Furthermore, the Supplemental Report seems to acknowledge
more clearly the particular hurdles involved in a “selection” process
of this type and magnitude:
The guarantees for judicial independence in existing courts
provide helpful starting points in this respect. However, they
may not be sufficient or at least not entirely transposable as
such to investor-State dispute settlement, in which the
asymmetric nature is such that only one type of the future
disputing parties controls the selection process. Designing an
appropriate selection process that, inter alia, ensures the requisite
independence of the adjudicators thus appears to be of even
greater concern in a setting of this kind.

98. Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added).
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As the practice at existing permanent international courts and
tribunals shows, the involvement of States (and, within the State
apparatus, in particular of State governments) may lead to risks
of politicization of the selection process . . . . Appointment on
the basis of political considerations rather than competence and
merit may undermine the quality of the decisions and, ultimately,
the perception of the adjudicatory body’s independence,
credibility and legitimacy.99

Ensuring that the “selection” process is multi-layered, open to all
stakeholders, and transparent, sounds good in theory, until one
realizes that in substance what is being proposed is that States
constitute an advisory panel to sign off on the qualifications of
potential candidates and “consult[] national parliaments” to “reinforce
the democratic element in the process.”100
B. UNCITRAL Working Group III
In July 2017 the UNCITRAL Commission met and decided, on
the basis of the CIDS Report, to have Working Group III, as it is
called at UNCITRAL — not Working Group II — consider the report
at its next meeting.101 The Working Group III was entrusted with the
task to consider ISDS reform “so as not to burden Working Group II
unduly while it continued to fulfil its mandate [of its work on the
enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international
commercial conciliation].”102 It is curious that this task has been
assigned by UNCITRAL just last year to Working Group III, which
previously has dealt with international legislation on shipping,
transport law, and, only most recently, online dispute resolution, and
not to Working Group II, which for the past seventeen years has dealt
exclusively and broadly with arbitration, conciliation and dispute
settlement, and in which, inter alia, the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law were incubated. Furthermore,
the Commission emphasized that delegations to Working Group III
should be government-led, while noting the benefits of involving
diverse stakeholders.103 One asks, “What is the reason that the
99. Id. ¶¶ 106-08 (emphasis added).
100. Id. ¶¶ 111-16.
101. Id. ¶¶ 106-08.
102. G.A. Rep. of the Comm. on Int’l Trade Law of Its Fiftieth Session, at ¶ 260, U.N.
Doc. A/72/17 (July 3-21, 2017).
103. Id. ¶¶ 250-51, 264.
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UNCITRAL Commission has assigned consideration of the EUinspired International Investment Court proposal, not to the Working
Group with by far the most extensive experience with international
arbitration, but rather to one whose exposure to the field has been
limited to online arbitration, along with shipping and transport law?
Why is it charged to have predominately government delegations?
Are the dice being loaded?”
The first Working Group III session following the Commission’s
July 2017 decision, held in Vienna from November 27 to December
1, 2017,104 revealed a telling picture of the work now being political,
rather than, as is traditional with Working Groups, being technical
work of experts. Virtually two of the five days of the meeting were
taken up with a fight over who should chair the meeting, an issue
hitherto always resolved by consensus.105 Incredibly, the many EU
Member States Delegations present carried the day for the election of
a senior official of Canada106 who by definition is bound to CETA,
and hence to the EU International Investment Court imbedded in
CETA. Can there be any doubt but that UNCITRAL itself is being
politicized and that, as noted above, the dice in fact have been loaded?
Nevertheless reluctant delegates grappled with the monumental task
of reforming ISDS, and Part I of the Working Group III Report from
that session emphasized perceived concerns of some States over the
cost and duration of proceedings.107 Several of the more sober-minded
participants in the session argued that deliberations relating to
duration and cost should be fact based.108 The Working Group
ultimately settled on a compromise, recording that perceptions are
also relevant in maintaining the “legitimacy” of ISDS, the ubiquitous
buzzword that Professor Christoph Schreuer recently decried as “one
of those Humpty Dumpty words designed to arouse pleasurable
104. U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III on the Work of Its
Thirty-Fourth Session, Part I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (2017).
105. Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual, BLOG OF
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-notbusiness-as-usual/ [https://perma.cc/97PV-YBYW] (“In the whole history of UNCITRAL
[established in 1966], only one issue had ever been put to the vote and that was the decision on
whether to move the headquarters of UNCITRAL to Vienna [from New York City]. The
premium placed on consensus meant that voting enjoyed somewhat of a mystical taboo. That
was, at least, until this meeting when the spell was broken for a second time.”).
106. U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III on the Work of Its
Thirty-Fourth Session, supra note 104, at ¶ 14.
107. Id. ¶¶ 30-48.
108. Id. ¶ 35.
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emotions without conveying meaning” in his keynote address at the
Investment Treaty Arbitration Conference in Prague on October 26,
2017.109 Some less radical reforms, namely those of clarifying a
tribunal’s powers of cost apportionment and ordering claimants to
post security for costs in certain scenarios, were also discussed,110
mirroring recommendations made by Professor Schreuer in his
speech.111
V. FEAR AND OVERREACTION
Now, why is this happening? As mentioned earlier, the EUpursued International Investment Court is just the paramount move in
a longstanding series of moves by States to repossess investor-State
arbitration and what should be a matter between investors and their
host States. It is fear. That is number one. When Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was sworn into office the first time early in 1933, the
United States was in the depths of the Depression, which greatly
affected the generation of people living during that time. President
Roosevelt said, “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.”112 Fear is a
poor advisor, hence an inappropriate driving force in contemporary
international investment arbitration.
Take environmental and health cases, for example. To our
knowledge, no ISDS tribunal has ever found a legitimately
environmental or health law or regulation of a State to have breached
a BIT or a multilateral investment treaty. But there are still outcries.
Take the Ethyl case,113 in which one of the authors of this Article was
appointed by Ethyl in the late 1990s. It was the first NAFTA case
against Canada.114 That case involved a bill that was introduced in the
Canadian Parliament in May of 1995 and enacted as the Act on April
109. Marie Talašová Jaroslav Kudrna, Sebastian Perry & Laetitia Nappert-Rosales.,
There’s “no alternative” to investment arbitration, says Schreuer, GLOBAL ARBITRATION
REVIEW, (Dec. 22, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151619/theres-noalternative-to-investment-arbitration-says-schreuer [http://perma.cc/539Q-DPEQ].
110. Caron, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 46-49 & 59-61.
111. Talašová, supra note 109.
112. Donald Pohlmeyer, FDR Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself 1933 Inaugural Address,
(Sep.
23,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHFTtz3uucY
YOUTUBE
[http://perma.cc/QNL4-C6G8].
113. See generally Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL (June 24, 1998).
114. Laura Eggertson, Ethyl sues Ottawa over MMT law, THE FINANCIAL POST, Sept.
11, 1996, http://appletonlaw.com/files/Ethyl/media%20clippings.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7E9QS53]
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25, 1997, that prohibited the commercial importation of and
interprovincial trade in Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese
Tricarbonyl (“MMT”), a fuel additive (the “MMT Act”).115 Ethyl
commenced NAFTA arbitration proceedings in April 1997, arguing
that the measure was illegitimate and discriminatory.116 Canada
argued that while MMT was designed to increase octane in gasoline,
it affected emission control on automobiles, thereby presenting an
environmental hazard due to manganese becoming airborne.117
The arbitration was short-lived. Following the Tribunal’s
unanimous ruling in June 1998 rejecting some of Canada’s objections
to its jurisdiction and joining others to the merits118 the case was
settled for US$13 million.119 The decision confirming the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction came less than two weeks after a domestic Canadian
panel convened under Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade
(“AIT”), concluded with its Provinces and Territories,120 had
undermined Canada’s position in defending the Ethyl case. The
Government of Alberta had commenced proceedings under the AIT
alleging that the MMT Act failed to comply with Canada’s
obligations under the AIT, whereupon the Governments of Québec,
Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervened as Complainants in
support of Alberta.121 A majority of the AIT panel hearing the case
ruled that the MMT Act was inconsistent with certain provisions of
the AIT and recommended that Canada remove the inconsistencies
and, pending such removal, “that the Respondent [i.e., Canada]
suspend the operation of the Act with respect to interprovincial
trade.”122 Canada was left without a leg on which to stand vis-à-vis
Ethyl, hence, the US$13 million settlement.
115. See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.
116. Id.
117. See Luke Eric Peterson & Kendra Magraw, Looking Back: Ethyl v. Canada case
drew early public attention to previously obscure arbitration process, and settled after
(Mar.
21,
2017),
tribunal’s
jurisdiction
ruling,
IAREPORTER
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/looking-back-ethyl-v-canada-case-drew-early-publicattention-to-previously-obscure-arbitration-process-and-settled-after-tribunals-jurisdictionruling/ [http://perma.cc/9UF7-DXBR];John Geddes, Ethyl sues Ottawa for US$200M over
MMT ban, THE FIN. POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at 6.
118. See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.
119. Daphne Eviatar, The NAFTA Edge, THE AM. LAW. 80, 83 (2005).
120. Gov. of Alberta v. Canada, Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between
Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, 13 (June 12, 1998).
121. See id.
122. See id at 1.
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Despite the brevity of the proceedings and the AIT panel’s
preceding decision adverse to the Canadian Government, the Ethyl
case attracted widespread media attention and evoked a vociferous
public backlash at the time.123
At the time, the media maintained that NAFTA Chapter 11
proceedings constituted a “regulatory chill” restricting Canada’s
sovereignty, as demonstrated by the settlement with Ethyl and the
repealing of the MMT Act.124 Contrary to this widespread
misconception, Canada was motivated to settle the Ethyl case because
of the AIT panel decision. Faced with the AIT’s decision scuttling the
MMT Act, Canada had no alternative but to settle with Ethyl. This is
confirmed by Canada’s official governmental website in which it
describes the outcome of the Ethyl case as follows:
Settlement of the claim
Further to a challenge launched by three [sic] Canadian provinces
under the Agreement on Internal Trade, a Canadian federalprovincial dispute settlement panel found that the federal
measure was inconsistent with certain provisions of that
Agreement. Following this decision, Canada and Ethyl settled all
outstanding matters, including the Chapter Eleven claim.125

123. See Geddes, supra note 117; Michael Valpy, How free trade threatens democracy,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/how-freetrade-threatens-democracy/article760604/ [https://perma.cc/T36X-QTNV];SCOTT SINCLAIR,
CANADA’S TRACK RECORD UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11: NORTH AMERICAN INVESTORSTATE DISPUTES TO JANUARY 2018 11 (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2018)
(describing the latest misconceptions on Ethyl).
124. See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.
125. We note that the official Canadian Government website describing the Ethyl
Corporation v. Government of Canada case identifies “three Canadian provinces.” See Gov.
of Canada, NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment, Cases filed against the Government of Canada:
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA (last modified Dec.
21, 2017), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng#archived [https://perma.cc/5PTW-7XRF]. However,
according to the AIT Panel decision, four provinces were Complainants. But see Gov. of
Alberta v. Canada, Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada
Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, at 1 (emphasis added).
The Government of Alberta (the Complainant) contends that the Act fails to
comply with Canada’s (the Respondent) obligations under the Agreement on
Internal Trade (the Agreement), and that the inconsistencies cannot be justified
by reference to the Agreement’s provisions for measures associated with
legitimate objectives. The Complainant contends that the Act has impaired
internal trade, caused injury to Alberta refiners, and is inconsistent with
general and specific provisions of the Agreement. The Governments of
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Despite the Canadian Government’s straightforward explanation
as to why it settled the Ethyl case, local politicians continue to
remember the ordeal differently.126
The results of the tobacco labeling cases—Philip Morris Brands
Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay and Philip Morris Asia
Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia—further confirm that no
health-protection legislation or regulation has been found by any
ISDS tribunal to have breached any provision of any investment
treaty.127 The tobacco cases have attracted particular attention of
critics of investor-State arbitration despite the fact that both Australia

Québec, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan (also Complainants) intervened in
support of Alberta. The Government of Nova Scotia did not file a written
submission or present oral arguments.
126. Elizabeth May, leader of the Green Party of Canada and MP for Saanich-Gulf
Islands, held a press conference in September 2012 in which she warned against the adoption
of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. During the
press conference, she highlighted the controversy that the Ethyl case brought in Canada:
We know the experience of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Everyone believed and
including all the groups fighting NAFTA, that Chapter 11 was innocuous. It
was never raised in the fight over NAFTA and yet the investor-State
provisions of NAFTA have proven to be the most corrosive of democracy the
most undermining of Canadian laws it’s only under Chapter 11 of NAFTA that
a U.S. corporation had the right to claim damages against Canada and cause
our Governments to repeal laws passed in our Parliament. It was bad enough
when it was a US multinational, like Ethyl Corporation of Richmond, Virginia,
getting laws against its toxic gasoline additive MMT cancelled. But how much
worse is it to imagine that the Communist Chinese Government out of Beijing
through its various tentacles of Sinopec and PetroChina and CNOOC will be
able to trump Canadian law through complaints in this process that set out in
this agreement.
Elizabeth May: Red Carpet For China (Press Conference Q and A), YOUTUBE (Sept. 27,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjwjBe8tlAo [https://perma.cc/ZWY9-F2QW].
(The Authors of this Article have transcribed the block quotation manually by listening to the
YouTube clip. Thus, the block quotation is not an official transcription.)
Since Elizabeth May’s statement, the treaty entered into force on October 1, 2014 and
retained an investor-State arbitration provision in article 20. See Canada-China Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, art. 20; Trade and investment agreements,
AFFAIRS
CANADA
(last
modified
May.
29,
2017),
GLOBAL
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/index.aspx?lang=eng&country_pays=China&menu_id=147
[https://perma.cc/D4WVU654].
127. See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 590(July 8, 2016); Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, sec. VII (Dec. 17, 2015).
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and Uruguay won those cases.128 Even if cases come out in favor of
States the critics disregard the result and emphasize the alleged bias
towards investors in the ISDS system.129 When a majority of the
tribunal in Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay found in favor of the State, rather than recognize that ISDS
works, the critics turned their attention to the hefty fees collected by
ISDS lawyers and how the case should not have been brought in the
first place.130 They look right past the unchallengeable fact, as
illustrated by the NAFTA case cited above and the tobacco cases, that
States’ “policy space” universally has been preserved by ISDS
tribunals.
A. Separating Facts from Fiction
Prominent people, and publications that one might think should
know better, had they done the necessary research, have spoken out
emphatically against ISDS.131 States win the majority of cases that are
tried to an award. From 1987 through July 2017, 530 ISDS cases have
been concluded.132 Of those cases 37% were decided in favor of the
State (the claims were dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction or on
the merits) and 27% were decided in favor of the investor.133
Furthermore, 23% of the 530 cases were settled, 11% were

128. See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7; Philip Morris
Asia Limited, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12.
129. See generally Cecilia Olivet & Alberto Villareal, Who really won the legal battle
between Philip Morris and Uruguary?, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/28/who-really-won-legal-battlephilip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts [https://perma.cc/EDS3-HEWL].
130. Id.
131. See Transcript: Trading Democracy -- A Bill Moyers Special, PBS (Feb. 1, 2012)
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_tdfull.html
[https://perma.cc/K5MJ-EJ7V]
(“Today, foreign companies are exploiting Chapter 11 to attack public laws that protect our
health – and our environment – even to attack the American judicial system.”); Behind closed
doors, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13527961 [https://
perma.cc/MX23-A6R4]; Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone
should oppose, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/
2015/02/25
/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.0b6d9e62172d
[https://perma.cc/7KF7-TB2D].
132. UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures,
IIA ISSUES NOTE, ISSUE 3, at 4 (Nov. 2017) http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAJ6-7CQP].
133. Id.
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discontinued, and in 2% of the cases there was a finding of liability,
but no damages were awarded.134
VI. CONCLUSION
ISDS as a dispute resolution system is a service given by States
to the benefit of its citizens and corporations in the future. No
individual or corporation concerns itself with disputes prior to one
arising. In other words, ISDS is not an issue that is at the top of the
agenda of corporations. A paragraph from the October 24, 2017, New
York Times from the article titled, “‘Army’ of Lobbyists Hits Capitol
Hill to Preserve Nafta”135 encapsulates this point. On that day, more
than 130 high executives of large U.S. companies were sent “to
ratchet up pressure on lawmakers — many of whose constituents
work for companies dependent on Nafta — to keep the deal intact.”136
The article further states:
Bill Lane, the chairman of the Trade Leadership Coalition, which
advocates preserving Nafta, said that until recently businesses
had been largely silent on Nafta because they did not want to
undercut other policy priorities, such as rewriting the tax code to
secure a lower corporate tax rate.137

Lane continues: “‘But they also realize it doesn’t matter what the
tax rate is if you’re not competitive, and Nafta makes North American
manufacturing competitive.’”138 The statement came too little, too
late, because bigger priorities let it go.
What is the result going to be? One of two things will happen:
An International Investment Court will be established or it will not.
Hopefully, it will not be established. If it is, the large corporations
that invest in high-risk countries abroad have considerable bargaining
strength and, just as they did in the 1960s and 1970s, may opt to
negotiate their own dispute-settlement provision via contract,
presumably to their satisfaction.
Relatively smaller investors in foreign countries do not have the
same clout. One of two things will happen, both to the disadvantage
134. Id.
135. Ana Swanson & Natalie Kitroeff, ‘Army’ of Lobbyists Hits Capitol Hill to Preserve
Nafta, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/politics/naftalobby-congress.html.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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of the host States. If this court is established, the smaller investors
either will not invest at all — that is a loss for everybody involved —
or, if they do invest, when they are determining the return on
investment that they need to project to realize from this investment,
the risk factor will go up for want of a decent dispute-settlement
mechanism available should the host State violate the substantive
provisions of an applicable treaty.
The cost of foreign investment will be vastly more expensive,
which is largely due to an unnecessarily excessive risk factor. And,
the host State loses again. It receives the investment, but at an
extravagant rate compared to what it would have had had the
investors not been put in this situation. A telling example is the
revised position of the new President of Ecuador. Ecuador has and
continues to act as a respondent in investment disputes.139 Ecuador
has taken steps to distance itself from investor-State arbitration in the
past, but is now rethinking its stance,140 and, having recently trashed
or set about trashing all of its BITs,141 Ecuador’s new Minister for
Foreign Trade, Pablo Campana, has said, “In order to secure private
direct investment, we must have BITs.”142 So while some people are
waking up, nightmarish creatures continue to lie in wait, with the
fifteen-headed hydra the latest myth in need of being dispelled.

139. According to UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, Ecuador has been a Respondent
State in 23 cases, which ranks the country as the tenth most frequent Respondent. See
UNCTAD Division on Investment and Enterprise, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB (last updated Dec. 31, 2017). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad
.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry [https://perma.cc/5KNW-W9ZU].
140. Tom Jones, Ecuador in treaty U-turn under new leader?, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Oct.
17, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1149016/ecuador-in-treaty-u-turn%E2%
80%8E-under-new-leader [perma.cc/3KTL-5HWA].
141. See Tom Jones, Ecuador bids goodbye to BITs, GLOB. ARB. REV. (May 17,
2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1141801/ecuadorbidsgoodbyetobits [https://
perma.cc/7HUD-KW9K] (In 2008, Ecuador “terminated BITs with Romania and eight Latin
American and Caribbean States.” On May 16, 2017, Rafael Correa, the former President of
Ecuador, signed a series of decrees that terminated seventeen BITs with Argentina, Bolivia,
Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.); see also Javier Jaramillo
& Camilo Muriel-Bedoya, Ecuadorian BITs’ Termination Revised: Behind the Scenes,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 26, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/26/ecuadorian
-bits-termination-revisited-behind-scenes/ [https://perma.cc/7MM9-EFHP] .
142. Jones, supra note 140.

